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Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre - Department of Economics
Economics Working Papers

Economics Working Papers: Abstract 2008-11


Nummer

2008-11

Autoren

Anke Reichhuber, Eva Camacho, Till Requate

 

Titel

 

A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers
Abstract We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to overharvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects’ decisions during the treatments.

Keywords: common pool resources, collective tax, framed field experiment

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