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Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre - Department of Economics
Economics Working Papers

Economics Working Papers: Abstract 2004-09


Nummer

2004-09

Autoren

Horst Raff, Nicolas Schmitt

 

Titel

 

Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets
Abstract This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised by prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes.

Keywords: exclusive dealing, common agency, international trade, competition policy

JEL classification: F12, F13, L42

 

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